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THE CHILD CUSTODY PROVISIONS OF THE ILLINOIS
MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION OF
MARRIAGE ACT
Two gardeners produced the tender roots of a promising new rose in
the garden of life. Then they disagreed and separated, and now each
.seeks to have this tiny rose transplanted to his private garden. But
science teaches that in order for this rose to reach its fullblown maturity and beauty it cannot be transplanted from garden to garden,
but must be given permanency in location, accompanied with best of
loving and tender care.'
The child custody aspect of divorce law involves difficult social
and legal questions regarding whether and when a child should be
transplanted. When divorcing or divorced parents cannot agree on
plans for their child, the courts must decide who is to be responsible for
the care of the child. The judicial and statutory guidelines that trial
courts follow in deciding the fate of the child are known as custody law,
which has been described as "the most unsatisfactory, ineffectual, and
'2
frustrating area of family law."
The law of child custody is vague and amorphous. Although custody decisions have tremendous impact on the lives of the families involved, the body of law governing these decisions is imprecise and
defies exact description or penetrating analysis. Changes in custody
law are subtle, tentative and gradual, with few "landmark" decisions.
Imprecision and subtlety in custody law result from judicial application
of standards as general as "the best interest of the child."' 3 The trial
court enjoys broad discretion, 4 and its judgment is not disturbed unless
against the manifest weight of the evidence. 5 Statutes and reported
cases in this area of the law set only the outer boundaries for decisions
at the trial level, where judgments are based on "elusive and subjective
6
factors."
1. Jingling v. Trtanj, 99 11. App. 2d 64, 65, 241 N.E.2d 39, 40-41 (1968) (Hannah, J.).
2. ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, PROCEEDINGS 27 (1963) (remarks of Harry M. Fain),
quoted in Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modication of
Custody in and out of State, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 495, 495 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Nye v. Nye, 411 11. 408, 415, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952); Drury v. Drury, 65 I11.
App. 3d 290, 294, 382 N.E.2d 608, 611 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Nye v. Nye, 411 IUl. 408, 416, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952); De Franco v. De
Franco, 67 Ill. App. 3d 760, 771, 384 N.E.2d 997, 1005 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Caulkins v. Caulkins, 68 IlL. App. 3d 284, 289, 385 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (1979);
Drury v. Drury, 65 II1. App. 3d 290, 295, 382 N.E.2d 608, 612 (1978).
6. Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current Criteria, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 241 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Schiller].
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In 1977, Illinois adopted a new Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 7 The custody provisions of this Act,8 borrowed from the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9 codified Illinois custody law and
set statutory standards for many aspects of child custody in divorce
cases. This note will describe and analyze substantive divorce custody
law in Illinois under the new statute.' 0 After brief historical and theoretical perspectives, the note will focus on original custody decisions,
modification of custody decisions, de facto custody, removal of the
child from the state, and visitation rights. These areas will be explored
through description and analysis of case law prior to the new Act, the
provisions of the Act, and judicial applications of the new Act. Decisions in other states with similar statutes" will be compared and contrasted. Particular attention will be given to consistency and
predictability of custody decisions and to parental rights under the Act.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHILD CUSTODY IN DIVORCE LAW

At common law, the father had the right to custody of his chil3
dren, 12 a right which arose from the father's duty to support his child.'
A court of law had no power to take a minor child from the custody of
his father, 14 but the court of chancery could deprive the father of custody if he was guilty of "gross misconduct." ' 5 Thus, the early standard
provided for the father to have custody unless he was unfit.
The court of chancery developed an exception to the rule favoring
paternal custody, by giving the mother custody of a child of tender
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101-802 (1977).
8. Id. §§ 601-610.
9. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED §§ 401-410.

10. Not within the scope of this note are jurisdictional issues involved in custody disputes in
the courts of more than one state. Also not considered are the procedural aspects of the Illinois
statute which provide for representation of the child at the discretion of the court, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, § 506 (1977), recording of the court's interviews with the child, id. § 604, investigation and
reports by independent agencies, id. § 605, and judicial supervision of custody arrangements, id.
§ 608.
11. ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 25-331 to 25-339 (1973). Arizona did not adopt the modification
provisions of the uniform act, but rather set forth the best interest test for modification of custody
after one year. See id § 25-332; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-123 to 14-10-132 (1973). Colorado's
modification section applies only to the second and subsequent modification proceedings. Id.
§ 14-10-131; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§

403.260 to 403.350 (Baldwin 1978); MONT. REV. CODES

ANN. §§ 40-4-211 to 40-4-220 (1978). Montana omitted the uniform code provision that the court
shall not consider the conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.
12. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 589 (1877) [hereinafter cited as
STORY].
13.
14.
15.

See also J. SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 245 (4th ed. 1889).
Schiller, supra note 6, at 242.
STORY, supra note 12, at 589.
Id.
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years, especially a daughter.' 6 In 1849, the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the "tender years doctrine" in Miner v. Miner,17 affirming an
order giving custody of a seven-year-old girl to her mother over the
objection of the father. The court based its holding on the "tender care
which nature requires, and which it is the peculiar province of a mother
to supply."' 8 The tender years doctrine developed into a presumption
in favor of maternal custody, and the mother was recognized as preferred custodian unless she was unfit.19
A parallel development was the growing importance of "the best
interest of the child" 20 as a standard in custody decisions. The best
interest of the child was mentioned by the Miner court as support for its
adoption of the tender years doctrine, 2' and the principle was later referred to by the Illinois Supreme Court as its "guiding star" in custody
22
decisions.
In the 1970's, the changing social conditions in the United States
and the altered perceptions of women's roles and rights were reflected
in custody law decisions. 23 The tender years presumption in favor of
maternal custody was abandoned at least partially, 24 and the primary
standard for custody decisions was the best interest of the child. 25 This
standard has all the advantages of flexibility and sexual equality and all
the disadvantages of uncertainty and vagueness.
The previous Illinois divorce statute 26 allowed for consideration of
a wide range of factors in custody decisions by providing that the trial
court "may award the custody of the minor child or children of the
marriage to either party as the interests of the child or children require
S. .27 and "may . . . make such alteration in the . . . custody . . . of
the children, as shall appear reasonable and proper. ' 28 With these
16. Id.
17. 11 111. 43 (1849).
18. Id. at 50.
19. Schiller, supra note 6, at 243.
20. See, e.g., Harms v. Harms, 323 II. App. 154, 55 N.E.2d 301 (1944).
21. 11 Ill. at 49.
22. Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 415, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952).
23. Schiller, supra note 6, at 243-45.
24. See Jines v. Jines, 63 Ill. App. 3d 564, 380 N.E.2d 440 (1978); Pratt v. Pratt, 29 Ill. App.
3d 214, 330 N.E.2d 244 (1975); Marcus v. Marcus, 24 I. App. 3d 401, 320 N.E.2d 581 (1974). The
presumption that maternal custody is in the best interest of a child of tender years is recited in
Rayburn v. Rayburn, 45 IlI. App. 3d 712, 360 N.E.2d 142 (1977) and in Myers v. Myers, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 830, 366 N.E.2d 1114 (1977).
25. DeYoung v. DeYoung, 62 Ill. App. 3d 837, 379 N.E.2d 396 (1978); Huffman v. Huffman,
50 IlL. App. 3d 217, 365 N.E.2d 270 (1977).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1-21.4 (1975) (repealed 1977).
27. Id. § 14.
28. Id. § 19.
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broad guidelines, the appellate courts of Illinois developed the principles of custody law in Illinois. The new Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act, 29 adopted in 1977, codified many of the principles of the
case law and added a presumption in favor of continuity and stability
30
in custody arrangements.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHILD CUSTODY IN DIVORCE LAW

The development of custody law reflects shifting policy considerations and changing perceptions of children's roles and rights. When
children were seen primarily as economic entities capable of producing
income, receiving support and inheriting property, custody decisions
emphasized parental rights and duties in economic terms. 3' When children were seen as creatures to be socialized, the emphasis in custody
decisions shifted. More weight was given to consideration of the quality of care received by the child and to sexual role modeling for the
32
child.
Recent decisions under the best interest standard emphasize the
rights of the child and the psychological welfare of the child. Two theoretical approaches to the best interest test have attempted to give substance to that vague standard. The controversial book Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child33 suggests that the court choose "the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and development." 34 Addressing child placement generally, the authors
suggest that the least detrimental alternative is a placement plan which
maximizes the child's opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining a continuous relationship with a psychological parent.3 5 Applying
this standard to custody decisions in divorce law, the authors suggest
that the child's need for continuity requires that custody decisions be
final and unconditional rather than subject to modification and that
36
visitation be controlled by the custodial parent.
Other theorists suggest the standard called the "psychological best
29. Id.

§§

101-802 (1977).

30. Commissioners' Note, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409 [hereinafter re-

ferred to as Commissioners' Note].
31. See 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 460 (1936). See also Hewitt v. Long, 76 111. 399 (1875) (Breese,
C.J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Miner v. Miner, 11111. 43 (1849).
33. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN].
34. Id. at 53.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 37-38. See also Crouch, An Essay on the CriticalandJudicialReception of BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 13 FAM.

L.Q.

49 (1979).
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interest of the child." 37 The psychological best interest approach includes weighing many different factors in the child and his social and
emotional environment, including social stimulation, quantity and
quality of parenting, the child's personality, and the stability offered.
Proponents of this standard see custody decisions in clinical terms and
suggest that all parties in a custody contest be evaluated psychologically by clinicians who assist the court in making custody decisions. 3
According to this approach, modification of custody decisions should
be very difficult but not impossible. 39 Visitation is seen as the right of
the child rather than the parent, and it is recognized that the child
needs contact with the non-custodial parent in order to have a realistic
rather than fantasied image of that parent.4°
Throughout the development of custody law, there has been an
41
uneasy tension between parental rights and the rights of the child.
4
2
Theoreticians have no difficulty opting for children's rights,
and
many court opinions contain dicta to the effect that parental rights must
give way to the best interest of the child. 43 However, the precise nature
of parental rights and the degree to which these rights can be limited in
favor of the child's right have not yet been established.
The custody provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act reflect the developing theories of custody law. In the
Act's emphasis on psychological factors in determining custody-4 and
its difficult standards for modification of custody,4 5 it can be seen as
embracing the psychological best interest theory rather than the least
detrimental alternative theory. However, in its provisions for visitation,46 the Act appears to recognize some residual parental rights. The
provisions of the Illinois Act will be analyzed in terms of its purposes,
the case law that preceded them, and that case law that has applied
them.

37. Watson, The Children ofArmageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 67-74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Watson]. See also Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
38. Watson, supra note 37, at 74-76.
39. Id. at 80.
40. Id. at 85.
41. See text accompanying notes 107-15 and 176-78 infra.
42. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 7; Watson, supra note 37, at 56.
43. See, e.g., Chodzko v. Chodzko, 66 Il1. 2d 28, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976); Soldner v. Soldner, 69
111.App. 3d 97, 386 N.E.2d 1153 (1979).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (1977).
45. Id. § 610.
46. Id. § 607.
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ORIGINAL CUSTODY DETERMINATION

Under the new Illinois Act, a parent may commence an action for
custody by filing a petition for dissolution of marriage, a petition for
legal separation, a petition for a declaration of invalidity of a marriage,
or a petition for custody. 47 A custody proceeding is commenced auto4
matically upon filing for a dissolution of marriage.
A non-parent may file a petition for custody under this Act only if
the child is not in the physical custody of either parent,4 9 but a nonparent may be allowed to intervene in a custody proceeding commenced by one of the parents.50 Other non-parent custody petitions
must be filed under the Juvenile Court Act 5 and must allege that the
52
child is neglected, dependent, or in need of supervision.
The test used in originally determining custody is the best interest
of the child.5 3 Section 602(a) of the Act provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community;
and
(5) 4 the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.5
Case law has developed some guides for the courts in considering
the factors that make up the best interest test. The agreement of the
parents is to be considered, but the interest of the child, rather than the
47. Id. § 601(d)(1).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 601(d)(2).
50. Id. § 601(e).
51. Id. ch. 37, §§ 701-707.
52. Id. § 702-1; see also text accompanying notes 113-15 infra; Commissioners' Note, sunpra
note 30, at § 401. A non-parent with physical custody of a child may not only have standing to file
a petition for custody but, in a modification of custody proceeding, a non-parent need only show
best interest to gain legal custody after the child is integrated into his home. See text accompanying notes 157-78 infra.
But see Henderson v. Henderson, 568 P.2d 177 (Mont. 1977). In Henderson, the paternal
aunt picked up the children from the custodial father's home immediately after his death, then
filed a petition for temporary custody, which the court granted. On appeal, the Montana Supreme
Court reversed, distinguishing "custodial rights" from "actual and immediate control" in holding
that the aunt did not have standing to petition for custody. Id. at 179.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a) (1977).
54. Id.
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parents, is paramount. 5" The wishes of the child are to be considered,
but the child's preference by itself is not determinative.5 6 Thus, a fourteen-year-old boy's wish to live with his father rather than his mother
and stepfather was not controlling, and the court could properly order
that he remain with his mother. 57 For the most part, however, appellate review of a custody determination consists of a review of all the
evidence relating to the best interest of the child; 58 the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed unless against the manifest weight of the evidence. 59
Finding Required

An important question concerns the nature of the finding required
of the trial court in a contested original custody determination. May
the court simply make a finding of best interest so long as the record
shows consideration of the relevant factors? Or must the court make a
specific finding as to each factor listed in the statute? In Wurm v.
Wurm, 0 the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District reversed
a custody order based on a finding of best interest, noting that the findings of the trial court omitted "those factors which the Act mandates
that the trial court 'shall consider.' ",61 The case 62was remanded for
specific findings of fact as to the statutory criteria.
Although the holding in Wurm may appear to strain the language
55. The Act specifies that parental agreements regarding custody are not binding on the
court. Id. § 502(b).
56. Savre v. Savre, 61 Ill. App. 3d 11, 377 N.E.2d 850 (1978) (modification of custody case).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Drury v. Drury, 65 11. App. 3d 290, 382 N.E.2d 608 (1978); McDonald v. McDonald, 13 Ill. App. 3d 87, 299 N.E.2d 787 (1973). McDonaldand Drury are custody modification
cases. Since there are far more appeals of custody modification cases than of original custody
cases, many of the principles of general custody law were developed in appellate opinions on
custody modification.
59. See, e.g., Caulkins v. Caulkins, 68 IUl. App. 3d 284, 289, 385 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (1979);
Drury v. Drury, 65 Ill. App. 3d 290, 295, 382 N.E.2d 608, 612 (1978).
60. 68 11. App. 3d 168, 385 N.E.2d 894 (1979).
61. Id. at 170, 385 N.E.2d at 896.
62. Id. at 171, 385 N.E.2d at 896. In Wurm, the decree of divorce was entered on April 18,
1977, and the supplemental order granting permanent custody was entered on November 4, 1977.
The new Act took effect on October i, 1977. In West v. West, 76 Iil. 2d 226, 390 N.E.2d 880
(1979), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed an appellate court judgment in similar circumstances,
holding that the new statute ought not be applied to factual determinations already made at the
trial level. Thus, West may overrule Wurm on the narrow issue of timing but never reached the
substantive holding in Wurm.
The Third District later softened its Wurm holding and indicated that neither a recital of
specific factors nor written findings of fact is required, but there must be some indication in the
record that the trial court considered the factors listed in the statute. In re Custody of Melear, 76
Ill. App. 3d 706, 708-09, 395 N.E.2d 208, 210 (1979).
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of the statute by reading "shall consider" 63 to mean "shall make a finding in regard to," other states with an identical statutory provision have
reached similar conclusions. 64 The Montana Supreme Court reversed a
custody judgment based on a finding of best interest and held that the
lower court "should make a specific finding, stating the wishes of the
children as to their custodian, and, if the court determines that the children's wishes are not to be followed, the court should state in its findings the reason it has chosen not to follow their wishes. '65 In another
Montana case, 66 the court reviewed a custody judgment factor by factor, giving more weight to the factors at issue in the case. 67 Montana's
approach appears to be to require specific findings of fact as to any
statutory factors at issue.
A similar approach is seen in a Colorado Court of Appeals deci68
sion vacating a judgment based on a finding of best interest and remanding with instructions to make findings as to the pertinent factors
in the statute. 69 Relying on both the divorce act and the Colorado Rule
of Civil Procedure 70 requiring separate findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the court held: "[T]here must be some indication in the record
that the trial court considered such of those factors as were pertinent,
and the findings thereon must be sufficient to enable this court to determine on what grounds the trial court reached its decision. .... ,,7
The Wurm holding, requiring specific findings as to the statutory
factors in the best interest test, has not yet been considered by the other
Illinois appellate courts. A consistent requirement that the trial courts
make specific findings would have the effect of limiting the broad discretion of the trial court and facilitating meaningful review on appeal.
The standards for custody decisions would become more specific as a
body of case law developed, and court decisions would become more
consistent and predictable. However, if each case situation is seen as a
unique combination of complex factors that defies generalization, a requirement of specific findings would tend to limit the courts' ability to
do justice in each situation.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a) (1977).
64. See In re Marriage of Jaramillo, 543 P.2d 1281 (Colo. App. 1975); In re Marriage of
Kramer, 580 P.2d 439 (Mont. 1978).
65. In re Marriage of Kramer, 580 P.2d 439, 444 (Mont. 1978).
66. In re Marriage of Tweeten, 563 P.2d 1141 (Mont. 1977).
67. Id. at 1143-44.
68. In re Marriage of Jaramillo, 543 P.2d 1281 (Colo. App. 1975).
69. Id. at 1282.
70. COLO. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
71. 543 P.2d at 1282. Arizona and Kentucky appellate courts have not addressed the issue of
specific findings in custody determinations.
63.
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Because the demise of the presumption in favor of maternal custody has resulted in confusion and uncertainty in custody determinations, specific and certain standards should be developed to guide the
courts in applying the best interest test. If these standards are developed through specific, reviewable findings as to the statutory factors in
the best interest test, custody contests will become less frequent because
outcomes will be more predictable. The holding in Wurm should be
adopted by all the Illinois appellate courts.
Irrelevant Factors
The statute specifies that the trial court is not to consider conduct
of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship
to the child. 7 2 This provision is designed to discourage parties from
spying on each other or using marital misconduct in a custody contest.73 Thus, there is no conflict in awarding custody to the parent
found to be at fault in the dissolution of marriage proceedings. 74 Problem cases in this area involve the sexual conduct of the parent seeking
custody. In some cases where the parent is living with someone of the
opposite sex without marriage, the courts have held that this factor, by
itself, is not to be considered in custody determinations. 75 However,
other cases allow consideration of parental sexual conduct as a factor in
determining custody by relating parental conduct to the child's moral
health. 76 The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in Jarrettv.
Jarrett.77 In the context of a modification of custody case, the trial
court in Jarrett awarded custody to the father because the mother was
living with an unmarried man. The Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District reversed, relying in part on section 602(b) of the new
Act. 78 The father appealed to the state supreme court.
The Illinois Supreme Court defined the issue in Jarrett as
"whether a change of custody predicated upon the open and continuing
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(b) (1977).

73. Commissioners' Note, supra note 30, at § 402. For an example of the type of nocturnal
408, 417, 105 N.E.2d 300, 305 (1952) (Bristow, J.,
spying to be discouraged, see Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill.
dissenting).
App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (1979); Myers v. Myers, 51 In.App.
74. Burris v. Burrs, 70 Ill.
3d 830, 366 N.E.2d 1114 (1977).

App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978) (modification of
75. See, e.g., Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill.
custody case). For a simliar conclusion by a court in another jurisdiction, see In re Marriage of
Moore, 35 Colo. App. 280, 531 P.2d 995 (1975).
App. 3d 760, 384 N.E.2d 997 (1978); Gehn v.
76. See, e.g., De Franco v. De Franco, 67 Ill.
App. 3d 946, 367 N.E.2d 508 (1977).
Gehn, 51 Ill.
2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979).
77. 78 I11.
2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979).
App. 3d 932, 382 N.E.2d 12 (1978), rev'd, 78 Ill.
78. 64 Ill.
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cohabitation of the custodial parent with a member of the opposite sex
is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence in the absence of any
tangible evidence of contemporaneous adverse effect upon the minor
children. ' 79 Using tenuous and strained reasoning, the court held that
continuing cohabitation by the custodial parent justifies removal of
custody from that parent.
The court acknowledged that section 602(b) governs custody decisions and section 610 governs modification of custody 8° and that therefore the court is to "disregard any conduct of the custodian that does
not affect his relationship to the child. '8 1 In spite of this statutory standard, the court held that the mother's conduct justified a change in custody even though there was no evidence of an adverse effect on the
children. The court reached this conclusion through the following steps
of reasoning: (1) The mother's conduct was a Class B misdemeanor

under Illinois law. 82 (2) Nonmarital relationships are against Illinois
public policy as interpreted by the court in Hewitt v. Hewitt.83 (3) Daily
exposure to a parent's disregard of existing standards of conduct "could
well encourage the children to engage in similar activity in the future."' 84 (4) Therefore, the children's moral development is endan86
gered 85 and custody should be changed.
Two justices sharply dissented from the court's opinion in Jarrett.
Chief Justice Goldenhersh, joined by Justice Moran, noted the major79. 78 Ill. 2d at 345, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
80. Id. at 342-44, 400 N.E.2d at 422-23. For a detailed discussion of the modification of
custody provisions, see text accompanying notes 116-55 infra.
The trial court decision in Jarrettpreceded the effective date of the new Act and thus appeals
from the original decision technically are not governed by the Act. However, the supreme court
stated that the relevant provisions of the Act codify prior decisional law and that the decision in
Jarrettis "not affected by the applicability or nonapplicability of the new act." Id. at 344, 400
N.E.2d at 423.
81. Id. at 344-45, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
82. Id. at 345, 400 N.E.2d at 423-24. In Illinois, fornication is a misdemeanor if "open and
notorious." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (1977). The court noted that the mother in Jarretthad
acknowledged to her children and her neighbors that she was cohabiting without marriage; thus
her behavior was open and notorious rather than private and discreet.
83. 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). In Hewitt, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
recognize a cause of action for breach of express or implied contract between 'rnmarried cohabitants. The court indicated that it was Illinois policy under the statute to strengthen and preserve
the integrity of marriage and safeguard family relationships and that any recognition of
nonmarital relationships should come from the legislature. Id. at 64, 394 N.E.2d at 1210-11. In
Jarrett,the court appears to have ignored the intent of the legislature to consider custody separate
from the conduct of the custodian that does not affect the welfare of the child.
84. 78 Ill. 2d at 346-47, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
85. Id. at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
86. The court distinguished cases in which the custodian's indiscretions are in the past rather
than continuing and situations in which the parental behavior is not known to the children. Id.,
400 N.E.2d at 424-25.
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ity's "nebulous concept of injury to the children's 'moral well-being

and development'" and the "fragility" of the majority's "conclusion
concerning 'prevailing public policy.' 87 As the dissent pointed out,
the effect of the decision in Jarrett is that a custodian's cohabitationper
88
se justifies removal of custody.

The Jarrett decision is clearly unjustified, and it appears to reflect
eagerness on the part of the court to condemn nonmarital cohabitation8 9 rather than willingness to give effect to the new Act's custody
provisions. It would be consistent with the court's position in Jarrettto

remove children from any custodial parent presumptively guilty of any
Class B misdemeanor 90 on the grounds that the children might emulate
the parental behavior. Even if the court's consideration of parental

conduct can be justified simply on the possibility that children may imitate parents, 9' clearly the effect of parental misconduct should be
weighed with all the other statutory factors in sections 602(b) and 610
of the Act rather than be considered as the determining factor.
Possible Dispositions
An original custody judgment based on best interest of the child
may result in custody with father or custody with mother, and the general rule is that neither parent enjoys a presumption in his or her
favor. 92 Siblings may be separated, with some children in mother's custody and some in father's custody, 9 3 but there is a presumption in favor
of keeping brothers and sisters together. 94 Special circumstances justifying separation of children between the parents include the prefer87. Id. at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 426 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id., 400 N.E.2d at 427. In a separate dissent, Justice Moran, joined by Chief Justice
Goldenhersh, further attacked the majority opinion as sanctioning change in custody based on a
"conclusive presumption" that the mother's living arrangements harmed the children. Id. at 35253, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting).
89. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill.
2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
90. A Class B misdemeanor in Illinois is an offense punishable by imprisonment for not more
than six months, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-3(a)(2) (1977), or a fine not to exceed $500, id.
§ 1005-9-1(a)(3). Class B misdemeanors include violations of license requirements for lie detector
operators, id. § 202-7, falsely reporting a crime, id. § 26-1(a)(5), and picketing a residence, id.
§ 21.1-2.
91. Such an interpretation would render meaningless the statutory provision that parental
conduct that does not affect the relationship of the parent to the child not be considered in custody
determinations, for any conduct known or potentially known by the children may be emulated.
92. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
93, See In re Marriage of Dow, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 177, 380 N.E.2d 1174 (1978); Temple v.
Temple, 52 I11.
App. 3d 851, 368 N.E.2d 192 (1977). For a collection of cases, see Annot., 98
A.L.R.2d 926 (1964).
94. In re Marriage of Dow, 64 Ill. App. 3d 177, 380 N.E.2d 1174 (1978); Mikrut v. Mikrut,
113 I11.
App. 2d 446, 251 N.E.2d 84 (1969).
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between the parents, 96 and special
ences of the children, 95 conflict
97
needs of one of the children.
Joint custody is neither specifically authorized nor prohibited by
the Illinois statute. Generally defined as an arrangement in which either the physical custody of the child alternates between the parents or
the parents share legal custody, joint custody is a controversial concept
because of judicial concern that divorcing and divorced parents are not
likely to be able to cooperate fully in the care of their children. 98 Although the statute is silent on the subject of joint custody, in the few
reported cases addressing the issue, Illinois courts have not actively disapproved of joint custody arrangements that were developed by agreement of the parents. For example, in Nye v. Nye, 9 9 the Illinois Supreme
Court indirectly approved annual alternating custody. The parents in
Nye had agreed to annual alternating custody at the time of their divorce, with the custodial parent to have possession of the marital home
during the period of custody. The father later petitioned successfully
for sole custody because of the sexual conduct of the mother. The appellate court reversed,1°° and the supreme court affirmed the reversal,
holding that there was no change in circumstances sufficient to modify
the original decree ordering alternating custody.' 0 ' Similarly, in Roth
v. Roth,10 2 the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District affirmed
modifying
an order continuing an alternating custody arrangement but
03
year.'
school
the
with
the custody periods to correspond
In contrast, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fifth District, in
Davis v. Davis,1°4 reversed a custody modification order which provided for custody to alternate every four months. Noting that the parents had been in extreme and prolonged conflict regarding custody of
their children and that the alternating custody order required moving
the children during the school year, the reviewing court held that the
alternating custody order was an abuse of discretion. 0 5 The opinion
described the disadvantages of joint or alternating custody and took the
95. Umlauf v. Umlauf, 128 Il. 378, 21 N.E. 600 (1889).
96. In re Marriage of Dow, 64 I11.App. 3d 177, 380 N.E.2d 1174 (1978).
97. Id.
98. See Davis v. Davis, 63 Il. App. 3d 465, 470, 380 N.E.2d 415, 418-19 (1978). Seegeneraly
Ramey, Stender & Smaller, Joint Custody. Are Two Homes Better Than One?, 8 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 559 (1979).
99. 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952).
100. 343 Il. App. 477, 99 N.E.2d 574 (1951).
101. 411 Il. at 408, 105 N.E.2d at 300.
102. 52 Il. App. 3d 220, 367 N.E.2d 442 (1977).
103. Id.
104. 63 Ill. App. 3d 465, 380 N.E.2d 415 (1978).
105. Id. at 470, 380 N.E.2d at 419.
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position that "alternating custody awards should be made only in certain exceptional situations.' °6
Davis can be distinguished from Nye and Roth in that the trial
court in Davis imposed an alternating custody plan on parents who
were in conflict, while the courts in Nye and Roth enforced alternating
custody agreements. These results are defensible as a general approach
to joint custody. Parental agreements are encouraged and enforced, on
the presumption that agreements of parents are in the best interest of
their child, while a child of parents in conflict is protected to some extent from continuous exposure to conflicts regarding his custody.
An original custody decree may award custody to a non-parent
also. The issue of the rights of non-parents, usually grandparents,
arises most frequently in the context of visitation rights 10 7 or in modification of custody cases where the non-parent has legal or physical custody of the child.1 03 In original custody matters, the court is directed to
determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. 0 9
There are no Illinois cases that address directly the question of what
standard should be used in determining original custody between parents and non-parents when parents have physical custody. However,
Illinois cases contain dicta to the effect that the parents' rights must
give way to the best interest of the child. 0 Conceivably, the best interest test might result in parents losing custody of their child to nonparents simply on a showing that the non-parent could better serve the
child's interest. Two separate doctrines may be applied to consideration of custody disputes between parents and non-parents. The parental right doctrine gives the parent a superior claim to custody of his
child, while the best interest of the child doctrine holds that whoever
best serves the child's interest should be his custodian."'I The courts
have not faced directly the conflict between these two doctrines. In custody contests between parents and non-parents, unless there are serious
questions regarding the parents' adequacy, courts seem to presume that
parental custody is in the child's best interest," 1 2 thus avoiding the conflict.
A presumption in favor of parental custody is necessary to protect
106. Id., 380 N.E.2d at 418.
107. See text accompanying notes 216-25 infra.
108. See text accompanying notes 156-70 infra.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a) (1977).
110. See, e.g., Chodzko v. Chodzko, 66 IU.2d 28, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976); Baehr v. Baehr, 56 I11.
App. 3d 624, 372 N.E.2d 412 (1978).
111. Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 7, 20 (1969).
112. Id.
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the rights of parents. Married parents' rights to the custody of their
child can be disturbed only by the provisions of the Juvenile Court
Act"l 3 which removes the child from the custody of the parents "only
when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be
adequately safeguarded without removal.""t 4 The Juvenile Court has
jurisdiction only over children who are delinquent, dependent, neglected, or in need of supervision.'" 5 Divorcing parents should be no
more vulnerable than married parents to loss of their child to third
parties.
MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY

An original custody order is subject to modification by the court as
provided in section 610 of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act." l6 The modification provision carries a presumption in favor of
continuity of custody," 7 establishing apparently difficult standards for
modification.
A motion to modify a judgment cannot be made within two years
of a custody order unless the court allows a motion on the basis of
affidavits that there is reason to believe the child's present environment
may endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health." 8 When a petition to modify custody is permitted, the statute
sets forth three separate tests to be applied. First, the court may modify
a decree only upon a finding of a change in the circumstances of the
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-707 (1977).
Id. § 701-2(1).
Id. § 702-1. For statutory definitions of the terms delinquent, neglected, dependent, and
of supervision, see id. §§ 702-2 to 702-5.
Id. ch. 40, §§ 101-802. Section 610 provides:
(a) No motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than 2 years
after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits that there is
reason to believe the child's present environment may endanger seriously his physical,
mental, moral or emotional health.
(b) The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment unless it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the prior judgment or that were unknown to the court
at the time of entry of the prior judgment, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the
best interest of the child. In applying these standards the court shall retain the custodian
appointed pursuant to the prior judgment unless:
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with the consent
of the custodian; or
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral
or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by its advantages.
(c) Attorney fees and costs shall be assessed against a party seeking modification if
the court finds that the modification action is vexatious and constitutes harassment.
117. Commissioners' Note, supra note 30, at § 409.
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(a) (1977).

113.
114.
115.
in need
116.
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child as known to the court (change in circumstances test). Second,
there must be a finding that the modification is necessary to serve the
best interest of the child (best interest test). Third, the present custodian is to be retained unless one of three special conditions exists: (1)
the custodian agrees to the change;" 19 (2) the child has been integrated
into the family of the petitioner with the consent of the custodian; or,
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely to be caused
by a modification is outweighed by its advantages (special conditions
120
test).
Under the previous Illinois divorce statute, the court was empowered to "make such alterations in the . . . custody. . . of the children,
as shall appear reasonable and proper."' 2' In case decisions under the
old law, the change in circumstances and best interest tests were developed for modification of custody. 22 The original custody decision was
held to be res judicata for all the facts known to the court at the time of
the decree. 123 A non-custodial parent was required to show that new or
previously unknown circumstances existed and that a change in custody was in the best interest of the child. 24 The only presumption in
favor of continuity of custody arrangements under the previous statute
was the rule that a parent could forfeit his right to regain custody if he
delayed unreasonably and was therefore guilty of laches. 2
The new statute appears to set a more difficult standard for modification of custody by directing that the court retain the present custodian unless the special conditions test is also satisfied. These more rigid
standards for custody modification are consistent with current theory in
the field of child development and child welfare to the effect that a
child's need for stability and continuity is extremely important to his
119. Section 610(b)(1) has not been construed by the appellate courts. It clearly applies to
change of custody by agreement of the parents, but its language may also allow the custodian to
consent to custody changes to a third party. It is doubtful, however, that the legislature intended
to make custody an assignable right.
In Barclay v. Barclay, 66 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1032, 384 N.E.2d 564, 568 (1978), the appellate
court used this section, along with section 610(b)(2) to support granting legal custody to third
party defacto custodians.
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b) (1977).
121. Id. § 19 (1974) (repealed 1977).
122. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 49 Ill. App. 3d 160, 364 N.E.2d 566 (1977); Taylor
v. Taylor, 32 Ill.
App. 2d 45, 176 N.E.2d 640 (1961).
123. See Taylor v. Taylor, 32 Ill.
App. 2d 45, 176 N.E.2d 640 (1961); Wade v. Wade, 345 Il.
App. 170, 102 N.E.2d 356 (1951).
124. See Taylor v. Taylor, 32 Ill.
App. 2d 45, 176 N.E.2d 640 (1961); Wade v. Wade, 345 Ill.
App. 170, 102 N.E.2d 356 (1951).
125. See, e.g., Look v. Look, 21 Ill. App. 3d 454, 315 N.E.2d 623 (1974).
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healthy and normal development.126 A special conditions test for modification of custody can be seen as a compromise between the old
change in circumstances test and the controversial belief that custody
decrees should be unconditional and final, with no possible judicial
modification.

27

The language of the new Illinois statute presents some problems of
interpretation and application. The first problem is the precise nature
of the special conditions test in relation to the established tests of best
interest and change in circumstances. The second is the finding of fact
required by the new statute.
The official comments on the uniform act contemplate the possibility that the special conditions test may preclude modification of custody even if modification would otherwise be in the best interest of the
child.' 2 8 This interpretation, adopted by the Appellate Court of Illinois
for the Second District129 and by a Colorado Court of Appeals, 30 indicates that a petitioner for a change in custody must show special conditions in addition to best interest in order to succeed. However, this
interpretation also leads to the anomalous conclusion that a court may
be required to decide against the best interest of the child if the addi31
tional standard is not met.'
The Montana Supreme Court has construed the special conditions
requirement of the uniform act as a "jurisdictional prerequisite" to
consideration of the change in circumstances or the best interest
tests.' 32 According to the Montana interpretation, the presence of the
special conditions permitting a change in custody is a threshold question or precondition which must be satisfied before the best interest test
can be applied. 133 Thus, a petitioner must first show the existence of
one of the three special conditions before he can present evidence of a
change in circumstances or best interest. While this construction
avoids the incongruous ruling against best interest, it requires a
126. Commissioners' Note, supra note 30, at § 409. See also text accompanying notes 33-40
supra.

127. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 37.
128.
129.

Commissioners' Note, supra note 30, at § 409.
In re Custody of Harne, 66 Ill. App. 3d 820, 384 N.E.2d 460 (1978), rev'd on other

grounds, 77 II. 2d 414, 396 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
130. In re Marriage of Larington, 561 P.2d 17 (Colo. App. 1976).
'131. See In re Custody of Harne, 66 IUl. App. 3d 820, 384 N.E.2d 460 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 77 IlI. 2d 414, 396 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
132. Gianotti v. McCracken, 569 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1977); Holm v. Holm, 560 P.2d 905 (Mont.
1977). See also Mahan, Recent Developments in Family Law in Montana, 39 MONT. L. REV. 1
(1978).
133. See Gianotti v. McCracken, 569 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1977).
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strained reading of the statute. Also, this approach is not helpful in the
usual custody contest between parents when the "endangers seriously"
condition is at issue, since the showing of best interest is intertwined
with the showing of serious danger.
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in its first consideration of
the special conditions test,' 34 quoted but did not expressly adopt the
"jurisdictional prerequisite" language of the Montana Supreme Court.
The Illinois court simply described the special conditions as "statutory
prerequisites"'' 35 to modification of custody judgments and did not address the conceptual problem of the relationship of the special conditions test to the best interest test.
Perhaps the special conditions test could best be construed as a
statutory presumption that a change in custody is not in the best interest of the child unless the special conditions test is satisfied. This approach recognizes a meaningful presumption in favor of continuity of
custody but avoids both the strained jurisdictional approach and the
paradox of requiring decisions against the best interest of the child.
The second problem area in judicial interpretation and application
of the statutory special conditions test has been the finding of fact required by the trial court. Illinois appellate courts, in the first opinions
under the new statute, took the position that no specific findings of fact
were required as to the special conditions test.136 However, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District, in In re Custody of
Harne,137 held that the trial court must make specific findings of fact
and reversed a judgment based on best interest. In Harne, the maternal
grandparent defacto custodians petitioned as intervenors when the father petitioned for legal custody. After the trial court ordered modification of custody to the father on the basis of best interest, counsel for
the grandparents presented a motion for reconsideration based on the
requirements of the special conditions test. The court responded:
I find it endangered their moral health and mental health since
Grandma and Grandpa are too old to take care of them. If you want
a ruling on that, I so make the judgment, whatever the wording is in
6-10. And I refuse to interview the children. .

.

. I will go over

again, it is in the best interest of these children, their welfare, that
their custody be reposed in their father and whatever the statute says
and whatever the law is about their moral whatever you said, and I
2d 414, 396 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
134. In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill.
135. Id. at 421, 396 N.E.2d at 502.
136. See Drury v. Drury, 65 Ill.
App. 3d 290, 382 N.E.2d 608 (1978);'Doyle v. Doyle, 62 IU.
App. 3d 786, 379 N.E.2d 387 (1978).
137. 66 Ill. App. 3d 820, 384 N.E.2d 460 (1978), rev'd on othergrounds, 77 IUI. 2d 414, 396
N.E.2d 499 (1979).
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find that's true, that grandma and grandpa are bad for them,
38
whatever words you want to use; they are better with their father.'

The appellate court reversed because the trial court had based the modification judgment on the best interest and had not made specific find139
ings of fact.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Harne emphatically approved the
requirement for specific findings of fact. Noting the policy favoring
continuity of custody arrangements and finality of custody judgments,
the court inferred legislative intent that there be specific findings. As
additional support for its holding, the court noted that only with explicit findings of fact by the trial court could the appellate courts intelli40
gently review the trial court judgments.
Other States with a similar modification of custody provision have
also required specific findings of fact as to the special conditions test. A
Colorado Court of Appeals opinion' 4' reversed a trial court modification order based on changed circumstances and best interest, noting
that "for the sake of continuity and stability, the statute . . dictates
that 'the court shall retain the custodian established by the prior decree'
absent the showing required by [the special conditions test]. The
court's findings do not comply with those requirements .
, 142 Montana's early decisions construing the modification provisions of the uniform act did not require specific findings of fact as to the special
conditions test. 43 However, more recent Montana decisions have consistently required specific findings in applying the jurisdictional interpretation of the special conditions test. '44
Prior to the Harne decision, Illinois' implementation of the modification provisions of the new Act was inconsistent and indecisive, and
the goals of certainty of custody judgments and stability of custody arrangements were not served as well as the Act contemplates. The Illinois Supreme Court has taken a necessary and positive step in
requiring specific findings of fact as to the special conditions test. With
138. 66 I11.
App. 3d at 822, 384 N.E.2d at 462.
139. Id.
140. 77 IU.2d at 421, 396 N.E.2d at 502. After holding that specific findings are required, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court's oral and written findings were sufficient to satisfy
the statute. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. Id. at 421-22, 396 N.E.2d at 502-03.
Illinois Practice Rules do not require special findings of fact in nonjury cases as a general
practice. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. I 10A, § 366(b)(3)(i) (1977).
141. In re Marriage of Larington, 561 P.2d 17 (Colo. App. 1976).
142. Id. at 19.
143. See Erhardt v. Erhardt, 554 P.2d 758 (Mont. 1976); Foss v. Leifer, 550 P.2d 1309 (Mont.
1976).
144. See, e.g., Schiele v. Sager, 571 P.2d 1142 (Mont. 1977); Gianotti v. McCracken, 569 P.2d
929 (Mont. 1977).
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specific, reviewable findings, a consistent and predictable body of case
law can develop for custody modification. As the law develops, frivolous modification suits will be discouraged, and continuity of custody
arrangements will be encouraged.
Modification of Stipulated Custody Arrangements
To the extent that a modification petition requires a showing by
45
the petitioner of a change in circumstances and of special conditions,
a modification suit is more difficult to win than an original custody suit
where the presumption in favor of continuity is irrelevant. However, in
De Franco v. De Franco,146 one line of cases in Illinois was cited as
authority for the proposition that an original custody determination by
agreement of the parties may be modified without regard to the stringent requirements of the modification section of the new Act. In cases
where the original custody order was by stipulation, this line of authority holds that the court may hear de novo a petition for custody and
best interest test as this test
make a custody determination based on the
47
is applied in original custody decisions.
The test for modification under the old statute was change in circumstances and best interest. The original judgment was considered to
be res judicata for circumstances up to the time of judgment, so any
petition for modification required a showing of change in circumstances to support a change in the earlier judgment. 48 In cases where
the initial judgment was by stipulation, it was held that the original
court had not exercised its discretion in judging the circumstances and
that the non-custodial parent could therefore introduce at a modification hearing evidence of circumstances existing prior to the original
hearing but not known to the court at the time of the original hearing.149 Thus, a modification decision in those circumstances could be
based on the best interest test, as in an original custody determination.
145. See text accompanying notes 116-27 supra.
146. 67 Ill. App. 3d 760, 384 N.E.2d 997 (1978). In De Franco, the appellate court advanced
the questionable proposition that the court may use initial discretion in deciding custody according to the best interest test if the original custody order was by stipulation. The court then decided
that the evidence was sufficient to meet the "more stringent" changed circumstances test. Id. at
766, 384 N.E.2d at 1001-02.
147. For the origins of this line of authority in case law prior to the new statute, see Valencia
v. Valencia, 71 111. 2d 220, 375 N.E.2d 98 (1978) (reviewing a judgment entered prior to the effective date of the new statute); McDonald v. McDonald, 13 II. App. 3d 87, 299 N.E.2d 787 (1973);
Harms v. Harms, 323 Il. App. 154, 55 N.E.2d 301 (1944).
148. See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
149. Schultz v. Schultz, 38 Il. App. 3d 678, 347 N.E.2d 749 (1976); Harms v. Harms, 323 Ill.
App. 154, 55 N.E.2d 301 (1944).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

This exception to the change in circumstances test is found in the new
statute at section 610(b), which states in relevant part:
The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment unless it finds,
upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior judgment or
that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the priorjudgment, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or
his custodian. .... 150
Thus, as the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District correctly pointed out in Boggs v. Boggs,- 5' a trial court may hear evidence
of circumstances which existed prior to a stipulated custody judgment
in considering a modification petition. 52 However, the conclusion
reached in De Franco1 53 that the court may exercise initial discretion in
such a case, is not warranted under the new statute which directs that
the present custodian shall be retained unless the special conditions test
is satisfied. 54 The new statute was properly applied in Boggs 55 because the court considered earlier circumstances to decide whether the
child's present environment endangered seriously her emotional health
and whether the advantages of change in custody outweighed any harm
to the child caused by the change in custody.
Legal Modification of "'DeFacto" Custody
When the legal custodian allows the child to reside with someone
else, the status of the child's custody becomes uncertain in several situations: first, if the legal custodian demands return of the child and the
defacto custodian refuses and petitions for legal custody; second, if the
non-custodial parent petitions for modification of the custody order
and the defacto custodian intervenes with a petition for legal custody;
and, third, if the legal custodian dies.
Early case law in the area of defacto custody looked to the parents' rights, holding that the natural parent's right must prevail unless
the parent is unfit. 156 In Wohiford v. Burckhardt, I5 7 the Appellate
Court of Illinois for the Second District considered the custody of a
three-year-old girl who had lived with her maternal grandparents since
infancy; the child's mother died shortly after her birth. When the father demanded custody, the trial court denied his petition, but the ap150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

§ 610(b) (1977) (emphasis added).
65 Ill. App. 3d 965, 383 N.E.2d 9 (1978).
Id. at 968, 383 N.E.2d at 12.
67 I11.App. 3d 760, 384 N.E.2d 997 (1978).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b) (1977).
65 IlI. App. 3d 965, 969, 383 N.E.2d 9, 12 (1978).
Wohfford v. Burckhardt, 141 IlI. App. 321, 325 (1908).
141 Ill.
App. 321 (1908).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
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pellate court reversed, holding that the father was entitled to custody
unless unfit.' 58
Later court decisions modified the harsh rule in Wohford, holding
that a parent could forfeit his natural right through unreasonable delay
in claiming custody. 159 These courts found the welfare of the child to
0
be a primary consideration. 16

The new statute's provision for defacto custody is part of the special conditions test for modification of custody: If the child has been

integrated into the family of the petitioner with the consent of the custodian, the petitioner may be granted legal custody in a modification
proceeding' 6' if he meets the change in circumstances and best interest

tests. 162 Since the defacto custody can be seen as a change in circumstances, the defacto custodian need only show best interest in order to
gain legal custody. However, in a contest between the non-custodial
parent and a non-parent defacto custodian, the non-custodial parent
must meet the best interest test and the "endangers seriously" condition, 163 while the defacto custodian must show only best interest and
integration into the family with the consent of the legal custodian.
The statutory tests were applied to a contest between parents in
Burnett v. Burnett.164 The father in Burnett was awarded custody of the
couple's daughter at the time of their divorce. Two years later, he
brought the child to live with the mother, but no change was made in
the legal custody at that time. After carrying the custodial responsibilities for two years, the mother petitioned for legal custody, relying on
section 610(b)(2) of the Act. The father claimed that he had not consented to integration of his daughter into his ex-wife's family, and, in
the alternative, that he revoked his consent by picking up the child at
school and taking her back into his home. The trial court found that
the father had not consented and denied the mother's petition. 65 The
Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District reversed, holding
158. Id. at 325. See also Cormack v. Marshall, 211 Il. 519, 71 N.E. 1077 (1904).
159. Look v. Look, 21 11. App. 3d 454, 315 N.E.2d 623 (1974).
160. Id. See also Sholty v. Sholty, 67 Ill. App. 2d 60, 214 N.E.2d 15 (1966); Hermann v.
Jenkins, 34 Ill. App. 2d 255, 180 N.E.2d 359 (1962).
Death of the custodial parent is generally seen as a change in circumstances requiring modification of the custody order. In the absence of unfitness on the part of the non-custodial parent or
defacto custody in a third party, the non-custodial parent gains custody. Thus, a maternal uncle
who was named as custodian in the custodial mother's will could not gain custody without showing that the father was unfit. Rish v. Rish, I1I11. App. 2d 243, 136 N.E.2d 575 (1956).
161. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b)(2) (1977).
162.
163.

Id. § 610(b).
See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.

164. 75 Ill. App. 3d 998, 394 N.E.2d 58 (1979).
165. Id. at 1000, 394 N.E.2d at 59.
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that the consent requirement of the statute requires only acquiescence
of the custodial parent to the change in physical custody and the integration into the family of the defacto custodian. 166 The appellate court
went on to reject the contention that this consent can be revoked, noting that it would be inconsistent with the policy of stability and con67
tinuity to allow revocation of consent.
In Barclay v. Barclay, 68 the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
Third District applied the statutory test of integration with consent and
affirmed a judgment granting legal custody to the paternal grandparents over the objection of the non-custodial mother. In Barclay, the
father was awarded legal custody of the couple's infant son and left the
child with the paternal grandparents. Six years later, the grandparents
petitioned for legal custody as intervenors, and the mother counterpetitioned for custody. The trial court found that the mother was capable
of providing for her son but granted custody to the grandparents, using
the best interest test. 69 Relying on section 610(b)(2), the appellate
court affirmed, noting that the father as legal custodian had consented
to the grandparents' defacto custody and that the mother had not tried
70
earlier to gain custody.
A possible application of the defacto custody provisions of the
new Act is in the area of stepparent custody after the death of the custodial parent. Although there are no cases directly on point, integration
into the family of the petitioning stepparent may justify modification of
legal custody to the stepparent after the death of the parent with legal
custody.' 7 ' A similar result was reached in a recent Illinois case 72 in
which the court relied on the provisions of the Illinois Probate Act 7 3 to
affirm a decree granting joint custody to mother and stepmother, with
physical custody to remain with stepmother, following the death of the

166. Id., 394 N.E.2d at 60.
167. Id. at 1001, 394 N.E.2d at 60.
168. 66 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 384 N.E.2d 564 (1978).
169. Id. at 1030, 384 N.E.2d at 566.
170. Id. at 1032, 384 N.E.2d at 568.
The statutory provisions for defacto custody were not applied in the Harne case, a contest
between the father and the maternal grandparents. Apparently, the grandparents did not rely on
the relevant provisions of the statute. Presumably, the result in the case would have been unchanged under the statutory test, because the court found that the children would be endangered
by remaining with the grandparents. See text accompanying notes 137-40 supra.
171. Callow, Custody ofthe Childandthe Uniform Marriage andDivorceAct, 18 S. D. L. REV.
551, 557 (1973).
172. Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski, 63 Ill. App. 3d 66, 379 N.E.2d 713 (1978) (reviewing a judgment entered prior to the effective date of the new Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act).
173.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/, §§ I to 30-3 (1977).
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custodian father. 174 The Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in a case which arose prior to Colorado's adoption of the
75
uniform act.'
The implications of the custody and modification provisions of the
new Act for non-custodial parents are fairly serious. It appears that
they may lose all possible rights to custody through a process of attrition. After an initial custody determination by stipulation or according
to the best interest test, the non-custodial parent cannot gain custody
without showing the special condition of consent, defacto custody, or
danger. 76 Additionally, the custodian may abdicate or assign defacto
to custody become superior to
custody to third parties, whose rights
77
those of the non-custodial parent.1
If the potential rights of defacto custodians under the Act are fully
recognized by the courts, protection of the rights of non-custodial parents may require statutory recognition and definition. Perhaps the statute should require consent of both parents to integration of the child
into the family of a non-parent as a condition for permitting the nonparent to gain legal custody. With the present statute, assurances to the
non-custodial parent that he can regain custody at any time are not
realistic, and non-custodial parents should be advised to protect their
child becomes interights as against third party custodians before the
78
custodian.
defacto
a
of
family
the
grated into
REMOVAL FROM THE STATE

Early Illinois cases uniformly refused divorced parents permission
to move out of the state with their children. 179 The custodian was seen
as an officer of the court who must remain within the geographical jurisdiction of the court. 180 Upon a showing of plans to leave the state,
the custody of the child was transferred to the other parent.' 8' In 1952,
the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District affirmed a trial
174. 63 IUl. App. 3d at 66, 379 N.E.2d at 713.
175. Root v. Allen, 151 Colo. 211, 377 P.2d 117 (1962).
176. See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 162-75 supra.
178. For general discussion of different approaches to the rights of defacto custodians, see
PsychologicalParents vs. BiologicalParents: The Courts' Response to New Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L. 545 (1979).
179. See Hewitt v. Long, 76 Ill. 399 (1875); Miner v. Miner, 11 111. 43 (1849); Smith v. Smith,
101 IU. App. 187 (1901); Chase v. Chase, 70 I11. App. 572 (1897).
The rule against removal was still in existence in 1949. See Seaton v. Seaton, 337 I11. App.
651, 86 N.E.2d 435 (1949) (abstract).
180. See Hewitt v. Long, 76 Ill. 399, 410 (1875).
181. See Chase v. Chase, 70 Ill. App. 572 (1897).
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court order allowing the custodial mother to move to New York with
her son in order to be with her new husband.' 82 The appellate court
relied on "modem ways of living" to change the old rule forbidding
removal.' 83 The court applied the best interest test in determining
whether removal was properly granted.' 84 The best interest test for re185
moval was later codified in the previous Illinois statute.
The new Illinois Act provides that the court may grant leave to the
custodian of minor children to remove them from Illinois "whenever
such approval is in the best interests" of the children. 186 This provision
is carried over from the previous divorce statute 87 and is not found in
88
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.'
Recent appellate cases have almost always allowed the custodial
parent to move out of Illinois with the child, 89 whether or not the custodian received permission from the court before moving.' 90 Moving
out of the country is similarly allowed.' 9 ' Although there is some authority to the effect that the custodial parent wishing to move has the
burden of proving that the move is in the best interest of the child, 92 in
most cases the burden falls on the non-custodial parent opposing removal to show either that the move is not in the best interest of the
child or that the intended move meets all the tests for a modification of
custody.193 This rule is consistent with the presumption that it is in the
best interest of the child to remain with the custodial parent.'94 The
182. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 346 Ill. App. 436, 105 N.E.2d 117 (1952).
183. Id. at 444, 105 N.E.2d at 122.
184. Id.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 14 (1975) (repealed 1977).
186. Id. § 609 (1977).
187. Id. § 14 (1975) (repealed 1977).
188. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED §§ 401-410.
189. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 372 N.E.2d 909 (1978); Reddig v. Reddig, 12 Ill.
App. 3d 1009, 299 N.E.2d 353 (1973); Norris v. Norris, 121 Ill. App. 2d 226, 257 N.E.2d 545
(1970). But see Quirin v. Quirin, 50 Ill. App. 3d 785, 365 N.E.2d 226 (1977) (explained in note 192
infra).
190. Jingling v. Trtanj, 99 Ill. App. 2d 64, 241 N.E.2d 39 (1968).
191. Dokos v. Dokos, 88 Ill. App. 2d 330, 232 N.E.2d 508 (1967).
192. Gallagher v. Gallagher, 60 Ill. App. 3d 26, 376 N.E.2d 279 (1978). In Gallagher,the
parents had joint custody of the child; thus, mother's petition for removal was also a petition for
modification of the custody order. The appellate court affirmed the order granting removal and
stated that the parent seeking removal has the burden of showing that the planned removal will be
to the advantage of the child and the custodian. Id. at 29-3 I, 376 N.E.2d at 281-83.
In Quirin v. Quirin, 50 Ill. App. 3d 785, 365 N.E.2d 226 (1977), the mother requesting leave to
remove neither alleged nor offered to show that removal was in the best interest of the child. The
appellate court reversed the order permitting removal, stating that the burden was on the party
seeking removal to show best interest. Id. at 788, 365 N.E.2d at 228.
193. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 372 N.E.2d 909 (1978); Norris v. Norris, 121 Ill.
App. 2d 226, 257 N.E.2d 545 (1970).
194. See text accompanying notes 117-20 supra.
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appellate courts have held that removal by itself is not a sufficient
change of circumstances to warrant modification of custody 195 and that
the additional factor of inconvenience of visitation is not sufficient to
warrant denial of a petition for removal. 196 Presumably, with more
stringent requirements for modification of custody under the new Act,
the non-custodial parent would be required to show that the proposed
move seriously endangered the child before he could petition successfully for modification of custody as an alternative to granting re97
moval.
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District, in Gray v.
Gray, 9 8 refused to affirm a lower court order which both denied the
custodian's petition for removal and also denied the non-custodial parent's petition for modification of custody, noting that a person "has a
right to move around wherever his best opportunities for livelihood
may be found and, of course, to have his family with him."' 199 While
the appellate courts have not addressed directly the federal constitutional right to travel as one aspect of the removal issue, denying permission to leave the state either by depriving a parent of custody or by
refusing permission for removal may be a denial of that constitution2 °°
ally protected right.
In the area of removal as in the law of custody generally, the rights
of the custodial parent have expanded while the rights of the non-custodial parent have receded. A non-custodial parent may lose any
meaningful right to regular visitation when the custodial parent has an
almost unrestricted right to move out of the state with the child.
VISITATION

The right of the non-custodial parent to visit his child has been
recognized as one of a parent's natural rights, although a qualified
right. In an 1878 opinion regarding a divorce decree which was silent
as to visitation, 20 ' the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the father had
a "legal right to visit his children, at convenient and proper times, in a
195.

See, e.g., Spencer v. Spencer, 132 Ill.
App. 2d 740, 270 N.E.2d 72 (1971); Jingling v.

Trtanj, 99 Ill.
App. 2d 64, 241 N.E.2d 39 (1968).

196. Gray v. Gray, 57 Il1. App. 3d I, 372 N.E.2d 909 (1978).
197. See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
198. 57 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 372 N.E.2d 909 (1978).

199. Id. at 6, 372 N.E.2d at 913, quoting Spencer v. Spencer, 132 Ill.App. 2d 740, 743, 270
N.E.2d 72, 74 (1971).

200. See Restrictions on a Parent'sRight to Travel in Child Custody Cases." Possible Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C.D. L. REV. 181 (1973). See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972).
201. Burge v. Burge, 88 I11.
164 (1878).
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decent and respectful manner. . . [but] has no right, in any manner, to
abuse the right, and if he should, he might properly be debarred the
20 2
privilege."
The present Illinois codification of parental visitation rights provides that a parent not granted custody is entitled to reasonable visitation unless the court finds that visitation seriously endangers the child's
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. 20 3 A visitation order may
be modified according to the best interest of the child. 2°4 Thus, the best
interest standard governs visitation, except for restriction or denial of
20 5
visitation in which case a finding of serious danger is required.
It has been recognized that the test for serious danger in restricting
visitation is not identical to the test for serious danger in modifying
custody. In Crichton v. Crichton,2°6 the trial court refused to restrict a
father's visitation in spite of allegations regarding his "immoral
propensities." In affirming the judgment, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District noted that the wife was erroneously relying
on custody cases rather than visitation cases.20 7 Thus, the court implied
that the test of serious danger in restricting visitation is more severe
than in modifying custody.
Under the "endanger seriously" test, a parent may be denied visitation temporarily because of mental illness

20 8

and both parents may be

denied visitation temporarily because of severe conflicts between the
parents, 20 9 but the opinions affirming such orders emphasize their temporary nature.
Although there is no authority for ordering a parent to visit his
child, 210 children may be ordered to visit their non-custodial parent.
For example, an Illinois appellate court affirmed an order directing two
children to visit twice monthly their mother who was in the peniten202. Id. at 167.

203.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §

607(a) (1977).

204. Id. § 607(b).

205. Id.
206. 75 Il. App. 3d 326, 393 N.E.2d 1319 (1979).
207. Id. at 329, 393 N.E.2d at 1321.
208. Taraboletti v. Taraboletti, 56 Ill. App. 3d 854, 372 N.E.2d 155 (1978).
209. Malone v. Malone, 5 Ill. App. 2d 425, 126 N.E.2d 505 (1955). In Malone, custody of two
children was awarded to the father and custody of one child to the mother, with visitation denied
to both parents. This decision arose out of a finding that the parents had "conducted themselves
in a manner which [was] contrary to the best interest of the minor children, and that. . . visitation
periods [had] heretofore resulted in accusation and counteraccusation of improper conduct toward
said minor children." Id. at 428, 126 N.E.2d at 506.
210. Commissioners' Note, supra note 30, at § 407, suggests that parents should not be compelled to exercise their visitation privileges. There are no Illinois appellate cases on this point.
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tiary serving a sentence for murder. 21'
The troublesome problem of refusal by the custodial parent to allow the other parent to exercise visitation rights was addressed in Huckaby v. Huckaby.212 In Huckaby, the parents had agreed to an order
providing that the father's obligation to support the child would cease
if the mother refused to allow visitation. Later, the mother refused to
allow visitation, the father stopped paying for child support, and the
mother petitioned for arrearages. The trial court gave effect to the
agreed order and denied judgment for child support not paid. 2 13 The
Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fifth District reversed, noting the
statutory provision that makes the orders of the court independent of
one another. 21 4 The court held that the duty to support cannot be bargained away and that appropriate sanctions for refusing to permit visitation would be contempt proceedings or consideration of a change in
2 15
custody.
Grandparent Visitation
The Illinois statute does not provide expressly for grandparent visitation, but there is precedent in Illinois case law for grandparents to be
21 6
granted the right to visit grandchildren after divorce of the parents.
Although the custodial parent is seen as having sole custody and control over the child, 21 7 the Illinois appellate courts have affirmed orders
granting visitation to grandparents in special circumstances. For example, when the divorced non-custodial father had been killed in the war,
his parents were allowed limited visitation with his son who was in the
mother's custody; 21 8 when the father was in military service away from
home, paternal grandparents were allowed visitation;2t 9 and when the
mother was out of the country, the maternal grandparents were allowed
visitation with the child left in the father's custody. 220
The Illinois Supreme Court set the limits for grandparent visita211. Frail v. Frail, 54 Il. App. 3d 1013, 370 N.E.2d 303 (1977).
212. 75 Ill. App. 3d 195, 393 N.E.2d 1256 (1979).
213. Id. at 197, 393 N.E.2d at 1258.
214. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 509 (1977) provides:

If a party fails to comply with a provision of a judgment, order or injunction, the
obligation of the other party to make payments for support or maintenance or to permit
visitation is not suspended; but he may move the court to grant an appropriate order.
215. 75 Il1. App. 3d at 199-200, 393 N.E.2d at 1260.
216. See, e.g., McKinney v. Cox, 18 Il. App. 2d 609, 153 N.E.2d 98 (1958); Lucchesi v.
Lucchesi, 330 I1. App. 506, 71 N.E.2d 920 (1947).
217. Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 330 Il. App. 506, 510, 71 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1947).
218. Id. at 511-12, 71 N.E.2d at 921-22.
219. McKinney v. Cox, 18 Il. App. 2d 609, 153 N.E.2d 98 (1958).
220. Temple v. Temple, 52 11. App. 3d 851, 368 N.E.2d 192 (1977).
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tion rights in Chodzko v. Chodzko. 22 1 In Chodzko, the maternal grandfather petitioned for the right to visit his grandchildren who were in his
daughter's custody.22 2 The trial court granted his petition, and the ap2 23
pellate court affirmed, relying on the best interest of the children.
The supreme court reversed, holding that "giving of the visitation
rights to the grandfather over the objections of the mother in the absence of any special circumstances justifying the interference with the
superior custodial right of the natural parent was error. ' 22 4 The court
distinguished the special circumstances involved when the non-custodial parent is absent or dead. 22 5 Thus, the Illinois rule regarding

grandparent visitation rights appears to be: only in special circumstances.
CONCLUSION

In adopting the custody provisions of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, the Illinois legislature took a decisive step toward the development of a consistent and predictable body of law to govern custody matters, and it established the basis for a presumption in favor of
continuity and stability of custody arrangements. The presumption in
favor of stability is consistent with current theories of human development, and the need for a consistent and predictable body of law arises
from the abandonment of outmoded presumptions which previously
guided the courts in making custody decisions.
The implementation and application of the new Act has just begun, and early decisions have been inconsistent and unpredictable.
The requirement for reviewable findings of fact in original custody determinations, if adopted generally, will promote the development of
meaningful case law. In addition, the recent Illinois Supreme Court
decision requiring specific findings in custody modification judgments
makes possible the development of a presumption in favor of continuity of custody and the development of some certainty and consis226 decision,
tency in this area of the law. However, the Jarret1
removing children because of the custodian's nonmarital cohabitation,
221.
222.
223.
224.

66 Ill.
2d 28, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
Id. at 30, 360 N.E.2d at 61.
App. 3d 357, 362, 342 N.E.2d 122, 125 (1975).
Chodzko v. Chodzko, 35 Ill.
66 II. 2d at 35, 360 N.E.2d at 63.

225. Id. at 33-34, 360 N.E.2d at 62. See generally Visitation Rights ofa GrandparentOver the
Objection of a Parent: The Best Interests of the Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 51 (1976-77).
226. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979).
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is clearly a step backward and a refusal to give effect to the statutory
standards for custody decisions.
If the new statute is fully implemented and applied, the rights of
parents, especially non-custodial parents, will be diminished. Eventually, the nature and quality of these rights will require definition, and
the preservation of parental rights, in some form, will need to be assured.
As traditional roles and expectations within the American family
give way to sexual equality and social experimentation, the legal system will need to adapt continually to facilitate dispute resolution and to
protect the interests and rights of children and parents who rely on the
legal system to make social and family decisions. Illinois has taken a
beginning step in this continual adaptation.
JOHN

H. DOLL

